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 In crisis situations, people tend to feel more compassion toward one victim than 
toward multiple victims (e.g., Slovic, 2007). Many have suggested that this collapse of 
compassion is an invariant feature of our affect systems, that emotions are not triggered as 
strongly by aggregates. The current studies suggest instead that the collapse of compassion is 
driven by motivated emotion regulation. People might view their emotion toward mass 
suffering as overwhelming or costly, and take steps to eliminate it. In the first study, subjects 
who did not expect to provide aid displayed more compassion toward eight children than 
toward one child. But when subjects did expect to provide aid, the collapse of compassion 
emerged, suggesting that it is driven by expected cost. In the second study, the collapse of 
compassion emerged over time, and only for those who could skillfully regulate their 
emotions. The implications of these studies are discussed. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Joseph Stalin is famously believed to have said that “one death is a tragedy; one 
million is a statistic.” Though this oft-cited quotation seems to imply that mass suffering is 
impossible to comprehend on an emotional level, it also suggests a darker possibility: that the 
scope of mass suffering licenses the elimination of moral emotions. When faced with tragedy 
on an unspeakable scale, the safest thing to do might be to turn away, rather than to feel the 
true weight of emotion. Recent times are certainly no stranger to large-scale tragedies. 
Hurricanes Katrina and Ike destroyed countless lives, and the country watched as individuals 
struggled to survive. Media coverage of these tragedies tended to focus on such single 
identifiable victims, eliciting sympathy and compassion in those watching at home. This 
approach makes sense from a practical standpoint, given that such emotions are powerful 
triggers for pro-social behavior (Batson, 1990; Batson, 1991; Eisenberg, 2000). What would 
happen, though, if people were shown the full scope of such tragedies? Is mass suffering 
really felt as tragic, or are those numbers just beyond our moral emotional reach? 
Most people would probably say that each human life has irreducible value. If so, 
then surely as the number of lives in a crisis increases, we should feel worse and do more to 
help. Economic theorists have argued that emotions and helping behavior should track the 
number of people in need of help; we should respond more strongly when more people are 
suffering, whatever the context (Schelling, 1968). And common-sense intuitions track this 
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prediction about how we would and should respond toward such crises (Dunn & Ashton-
James, 2008). Yet when psychologists measure actual emotion and helping behavior, a 
different story emerges. People tend to experience strong emotion in response to one 
individual in need of aid, and this translates into a strong desire to help. But when there are 
many individuals, people actually feel less emotion and act less charitably. Intuitive 
predictions aside, people appear to neither feel nor help in proportion to the number of those 
in need.   
A growing number of studies attest to this claim. Kogut and Ritov (2005, Study 3) 
presented participants with images of either one child or eight children, and asked them to 
report how much distress they felt and how much money they would donate. Distress and 
donation were both significantly higher toward one child than eight children. This study 
suggests that individual victims elicit more intense emotions and greater helping behavior 
than multiple victims. A recent study by Vastjfall, Peters and Slovic (in preparation; as cited 
in Slovic, 2007) demonstrates the power of this effect. They split participants into three 
groups, informing one group about a starving child named Rokia, another group about a 
starving child named Moussa, and the final group about both children together. Participants 
were asked how much money they would donate, as well as how positively they felt about 
the donation. Participants felt less positively about the donation and donated less in the 
combined condition, relative to the two individual-child conditions. Slovic (2007) concluded 
from this data that our emotions begin to shut down as soon as we consider more than one 
individual, with drastic effects on our decisions to help. 
This disconnect between emotion and number has been termed “the collapse of 
compassion” (Slovic, 2007). The collapse of compassion is important theoretically because it 
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describes a case in which emotion-based moral behavior deviates from logical moral 
principles. It is important for helping behavior because it means that large-scale tragedies in 
which the most victims are in need of help will ironically be the least likely to motivate 
helping. The collapse of compassion presents a psychological puzzle because it is still 
unclear why the collapse occurs. This thesis will explore the psychological reasons for the 
collapse of compassion.   
 CHAPTER 2 
EXPLAINING THE COLLAPSE OF COMPASSION 
 
 It is clear that people’s emotions typically respond less to mass suffering than to an 
individual’s suffering, but it is still unclear why this is the case, or how this is implemented 
psychologically. In his paper summarizing the extant research on the collapse of compassion, 
Slovic (2007) seems to suggest two different explanations. On the one hand, he suggests that 
aggregates do not trigger much emotion, so that the collapse of compassion is due to natural 
constraints on affective processing. Yet he then speculates that people “turn off” their 
emotions, which if more than a rhetorical flourish, implies that people actively disengage or 
dampen their emotions in response to mass suffering.  
  The affective constraints account assumes that our affect systems are not tuned to 
respond as strongly to multiple victims as to single victims. Invoking dual-process theories of 
social cognition, this account suggests that aggregates are represented differently than single 
victims and do not trigger as much intuitive, automatic affect. For instance, Kogut and Ritov 
(2005) have argued that individual-level representations are more concrete, focus more 
attention, and trigger more distress, whereas representations of groups are abstract, less 
salient, and less emotionally charged (see also Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Trope & 
Liberman, 2003). Also, individual-level representations receive more elaborative processing, 
which encourages perspective-taking and greater empathy (Hamilton, Sherman, & Maddox, 
1999; Sherman, Beike, & Ryalls, 1999). Similarly, Dickert and Slovic (2009) have argued 
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that attention toward a single victim is inhibited by the simultaneous presence of other 
victims, which dampens overall emotional response. Finally, Loewenstein and Small (2007) 
have outlined two routes to pro-social behavior – controlled deliberation and intuitive 
sympathy – and suggested that controlled deliberation usually takes a backseat role to the 
more powerful decisional influence of affect.  
These illustrations of the affective constraints account assume that most moral 
decisions are driven by gut-level affect (Haidt, 2001). This can prove problematic, given that 
intuitive affect is insensitive to higher numbers (Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, & 
Friedrich, 1997; Hsee & Rottenschreith, 2004), yet sensitive to non-moral factors such as 
attention, vividness, novelty, and social proximity (Loewenstein & Small, 2007). If the affect 
system does not respond as strongly to multiple victims as to single victims, then utilizing 
affect as a heuristic cue (e.g. Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters, & MacGregor, 2002) in moral decision-making might lead to startling deviations 
from normative principles.  
Even more striking, it is very hard to eliminate these biases, as deliberative attempts 
to correct these gut reactions backfire (Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007). For instance, 
providing people with information about the collapse of compassion effect only makes them 
feel less sympathy toward single victims, rather than increasing sympathy toward multiple 
victims (Small et al., 2007, Study 2). Priming a deliberative mindset has a similar effect, 
further suggesting the strength of the constraints on affective processing (Small et al., 2007, 
Study 4). Although this might seem sub-optimal given modern moral principles, it makes 
evolutionary sense for our emotions to be tuned to small numbers, given the small-group 
lifestyle of our ancestors (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005). And the ability to 
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actually feel the full scope of a mass calamity might be psychologically maladaptive. At first 
glance, these reasons seamlessly fit together to suggest that the collapse of compassion is due 
to adaptive constraints on affective processing. 
 Yet in suggesting that the collapse of compassion might be due to people “turning 
off” their affect, Slovic (2007, p. 90) seems to tacitly imply a second kind of account that 
stands in marked contrast to the affective constraints position. This second account suggests 
that the collapse of compassion is due to the motivated avoidance of emotion toward mass 
suffering. Some have speculated that when faced with unwanted sympathy and compassion, 
people might take steps to eliminate their emotions, such as avoiding the situation, distancing 
themselves from the victims, or by engaging in a generalized numbing of their affect systems 
(Hodges & Klein, 2001; Hoffman, 2000). Despite such speculations, these processes have not 
been spelled out in much detail. If the collapse of compassion is driven by the motivated 
down-regulation of emotion toward multiple victims, then it is important to know the specific 
motives leading to such regulation, and to find specific ways to infer that this regulation has 
taken place. Given the dangers of ad hoc explanation in positing emotion regulation and 
(limits on) emotion experience as opposing accounts for the same outcome (Gross, 1998)—
reduced compassion toward multiple victims—it is critical to triangulate my regulation 
account based upon meaningful motivators of and indicators for emotion regulation. 
This thesis will evaluate both explanations for the collapse of compassion. One 
possibility is that multiple victims simply do not evoke much emotional response. The other 
possibility is that multiple victims lead people to actively regulate their emotions so as to 
avoid feeling too much for the many. 
 CHAPTER 3 
REGULATION MOTIVES 
 
One interpretation of the line “If I look at the mass, I will never act” is that feeling 
proportional levels of affect toward mass suffering is aversive and paralyzing. If people 
expect to feel overwhelming levels of negative affect toward mass suffering (Dunn & 
Ashton-James, 2008), they might be motivated to avoid that experience. There are 
theoretically promising suggestions along these lines in the related field of empathy and 
helping behavior. Hoffman (2000) has discussed empathic over-arousal, the vicarious 
experience of overwhelming emotion in response to a single target of aid. Empathic over-
arousal is conceptually similar to personal distress, the egoistic complement to empathy 
(Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987; Batson et al., 1983; Eisenberg, 2000). Such over-arousal 
leads people to actively disengage from the target of aid, decreasing compassion and helping 
behavior. In short, people might try to get rid of their emotions if they think that they are too 
much to handle.  
Empathic over-arousal suggests that compassion toward multiple victims might be 
seen as psychologically costly. But it might also be seen as financially costly, and this could 
motivate people to avoid the triggers of such expensive emotion (Hodges & Klein, 2001). For 
instance, Shaw, Batson and Todd (1994) have investigated empathy avoidance, “the motive 
to forestall feeling for another in order to escape the motivational consequences of those 
feelings” (p. 879). Their studies show that empathy avoidance depends on awareness of an 
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opportunity to help and perceiving that opportunity as high in cost. They informed 
participants that they would be asked to help a homeless man at either high (5-6 hours of 
helping) or low (1 hour) personal cost. Participants were then given the opportunity to choose 
between hearing one of two appeals from the homeless man, which were described as either 
high or low in emotional impact. Those who expected that helping would entail high personal 
cost chose to hear the low-impact appeal. When helping is foreseen as costly, people appear 
to actively avoid feeling the emotions they know will compel them to help. It is worth noting 
that these studies have only looked at cost of emotions toward one victim. When faced with 
the prospect of mass suffering that requires a greater outlay of aid, people might find their 
emotions especially costly, and take steps to eliminate them. Thus, the belief that helping 
many victims would be costly or emotionally overwhelming might contribute to the collapse 
of compassion. 
Of course, these motives need not work in isolation from each other. It might be that 
the collapse of compassion is driven by the joint influence of psychological and financial 
motives. As an example of how these motives could work together, consider Dovidio and 
colleagues’ (1991) arousal: cost-reward model of helping behavior. This model posits that 
when people view a crisis situation they experience aversive physiological arousal, which 
then motivates them to take steps to reduce it. How they reduce this arousal is a function of 
two kinds of cost: cost of helping (e.g. money or time spent) and cost of not helping (e.g. 
guilt). Dovidio and colleagues (1991) have argued that if costs for helping are low and costs 
for not helping are high, then people will step in to help. But if both kinds of cost are high, 
people might redefine the situation and rationalize away any need to help. They would re-
appraise the costs for not helping as low rather than high, avoiding any costs for helping and 
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relieving their negative arousal. The kinds of situations that elicit the collapse of compassion 
– such as genocide and natural disasters – fall into this category. The cost of providing aid is 
substantial given the magnitude of the crisis, and the cost to the victims if they do not receive 
aid is massive. On this model, these are exactly the kinds of situations where we would 
expect motivated emotion regulation. 
 CHAPTER 4 
REGULATION SIGNS 
 
Thus far, it appears that mass suffering would provide people with at least two 
motives to reduce their emotions: aversive negative arousal and financial cost. There are a 
number of indicators that can be used to infer that such regulation has taken place. Three will 
be emphasized in the present thesis: self-reported regulatory effort, psychological distance, 
and emotion numbing. Effort is fairly straightforward: people might simply report engaging 
in more effortful regulation after they have actually engaged in regulation. Distance and 
numbing are more complex, and have been previously discussed as mechanisms by which 
people eliminate overwhelming empathic emotion (Hodges & Klein, 2001; Hoffman, 2000). 
Here they will be considered as indicators that regulation has taken place. 
Psychological distance. If people eliminate their emotions toward multiple victims, 
then they might feel more psychologically distant from the victims afterward. Psychological 
distance can be conceived along multiple dimensions – spatial, emotional, and social – and 
these various dimensions are inter-connected. For instance, Williams and Bargh (2008) 
primed participants with points on a coordinate plane that were either close together, far 
apart, or intermediate in distance. Greater spatial distance led participants to express greater 
emotional distance from their family and hometown. Similarly, construal level theory 
suggests that spatial distance leads to more abstract processing of social targets, which can 
lead to emotional distance (Fujita et al., 2006; Henderson, Fujita, Trope, & Liberman, 2006). 
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This emotional and social distance has furthermore been shown to preclude compassion and 
aid (Cialdini, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 1997; Hoffman, 2000; Jones & Rachlin, 2005; 
Levine et al., 2005; Small & Simonsohn, 2007). Though distance can reduce compassion, the 
current study tested the reverse causal path: whether the collapse of compassion would create 
psychological distance from the victims. When faced with mass suffering they cannot avoid, 
people might find ways to eliminate their emotions toward suffering victims, which would in 
turn create greater psychological distance.  
Emotion numbing. Aside from effort and distance, emotion numbing is a third 
potential indicator of emotion regulation. Recent research suggests that emotion regulation is 
a rather crude instrument, in that regulating emotion toward one target ends up numbing 
other, unrelated emotion experience. Recent research has investigated affective working 
memory, the capacity to maintain multiple emotional experiences simultaneously (Mikels, 
Reuter-Lorenz, Beyer, & Fredrickson, 2008). They had participants maintain affective 
experience from an initial image for a period of several seconds, before comparing it to the 
feeling aroused by a new image. Participants were presented with a new distracter image 
during the retention interval of this affect maintenance task, and told to down-regulate 
emotion resulting from the new image. This new down-regulation interfered with the 
maintenance required by the affect maintenance task, leading to worse performance. These 
results suggest a limited ability to regulate two sources of affect simultaneously: regulating 
one emotion entails regulating them all. As mentioned above, these findings imply that 
regulating one emotion interferes with other (and logically unrelated) emotion experiences. 
One byproduct of down-regulating emotions appears to be a numbing of other kinds of 
affective experience. 
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People who are motivated to reduce their emotions toward multiple victims might 
start down-regulating their emotions. Following Mikels and colleagues (2008), this 
regulation could be caught in action by presenting unrelated emotional items during the 
regulation process. If people are regulating, then they may show reduced emotion toward 
these items. People would be “turning off” their affect more generally, as a side effect of 
regulating their emotion toward mass suffering. Though emotional numbness has previously 
been shown to preclude compassion (Bushman & Anderson, 2009; DeWall & Baumeister, 
2006), what is being proposed here is slightly different. It is not that the emotional numbness 
per se is responsible for the collapse of compassion; rather, emotion regulation is responsible 
for the collapse of compassion, with numbing of other emotion experience as a byproduct. 
Summary. Thus far, I have been considering whether the collapse of compassion 
might be driven by a motivated emotion regulation process. I have proposed two possible 
motives for engaging in down-regulation toward multiple victims: aversive levels of arousal 
and high financial cost. And I have considered three possible indicators of this regulation: 
perceived effort, psychological distance from the victims, and numbing of unrelated 
emotional experience. The most compelling way to show that the collapse is driven by 
motivated regulation would be to identify conditions where people are not motivated to avoid 
their emotional experience. If the collapse of compassion disappears when these motives are 
lacking, then the motivated regulation account will have firmer ground on which to stand. 
 CHAPTER 5 
THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
 
The strongest way to test the motivated regulation claim would be to remove the 
expectation of having to help. If the motivation to avoid high costs drives the collapse of 
compassion, then removing the perception of high cost should eliminate or even reverse the 
effect. After citing the line, “If I look at the mass, I will never act”, Slovic (2007) suggests 
that emotion is the hidden connector between looking at the mass and action. But if people 
think they won’t have to act, will they let themselves look at the mass, and feel? It is 
noteworthy that one recent study that did not ask people to help did not show the collapse of 
compassion (Dunn & Ashton-James, 2008). Also, in the third condition of Shaw and 
colleagues (1994), participants who had not been told to expect an aid appeal were less likely 
than other groups to avoid emotionally impactful appeals. Whereas being asked to help might 
facilitate the collapse of compassion, not being asked might ironically counteract it. This 
would further justify the claim that the collapse of compassion is a tactical piece of emotion 
regulation that occurs only when emotions are seen as costly.  
If the motivated regulation account is borne out, this would run counter to prior 
theoretical and methodological assumptions in the collapse of compassion literature. Rather 
than representing the starting (and stubborn) default on emotional experience, the collapse of 
compassion would represent the final outcome of an emotion regulation process. The current 
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thesis aims to synthesize the foregoing strands of research by providing a more process-based 
explanation of what happens during the collapse of compassion. 
The model in Figure 1 presents the hypothesized processes underlying the collapse of 
compassion. The “collapse of compassion” can be described as the entire process seen in the 
model. The core of the model is presented in black, moderators are presented in green, and 
outcomes (aside from the critical outcome, compassion) are presented in gray. When people 
perceive mass suffering, they should feel a need to eliminate aversive emotional experience. 
This motivation to avoid negative affect should be moderated by whether people perceive 
that affect as financially costly. If affect is seen as costly, people should engage emotion 
regulation strategies. This emotion regulation should lead to lower self-report ratings of 
compassion toward victims. If affect is not seen as costly, then people should not regulate, 
precluding the collapse of compassion. Trait interpersonal sensitivity should also influence 
whether people are motivated to reduce their emotions (Graziano et al., 2007; Reed et al., 
2009). As for the kind of emotion regulation engaged, the current investigation provisionally 
assumes that people would apply some form of conscious, deliberate emotion regulation 
(e.g., Koole, 2009); the studies are agnostic as to more specific strategies (like re-appraisal or 
suppression) that people might utilize. Three indicators of emotion regulation – aside from 
changes in compassion – are regulatory effort, distance, and emotion numbing. Finally, 
regulation strategies should only translate into the collapse of compassion given adequate 
time and regulation skill. If time and skill are lacking, regulation strategies will be unable to 
create the collapse of compassion. 
In two studies, I attempted to show that the collapse of compassion is the result of 
motivated emotion regulation. Across both studies, the goals were to show that motivation 
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played an essential role in whether the collapse of compassion emerged, and that emotion 
regulation translated these motives into the collapse of compassion. Study 1 focused on the 
motivational piece of the model described above: when presented crisis information about 
either one or eight victims, does the relative amount of compassion felt toward those victims 
depend on the expectation of having to help?  I predicted that the collapse of compassion 
between one and eight victims would only emerge when people expected to have to help, 
suggesting that they were motivated to avoid high costs. Study 1 included three indicators of 
emotion regulation – regulatory effort, psychological distance, and emotion numbing – to 
bolster the inference that the collapse of compassion was driven by motivated emotion 
regulation. 
Study 2 focused more on the regulation piece of the model, holding the motivational 
element constant and testing moderators of the regulation process. In this study, all 
participants expected to help one, four, or eight victims. What was unique was the inclusion 
of a dynamic measure of affect, something previously unseen in collapse of compassion 
research. If the collapse of compassion depends on emotion regulation, then stark differences 
by number of victims might only emerge over time as people use controlled resources to 
modify their natural emotional reactions (e.g. Greene et al., 2001). Showing this critical 
moderation by time would usefully avoid the conflation of the outcomes typically reported 
on retrospective rating scales with the processes involved. Study 2 also included trait 
measures of emotion regulation ability, also unique given the dearth of individual difference 
measures in past studies. Showing that the collapse of compassion emerges only over time 
and only for those who are good emotion regulators would provide evidence in favor of a 
motivated regulation account.
 CHAPTER 6 
STUDY 1 
 
Study 1 investigated whether the collapse of compassion results from a motivated 
emotion regulation process. More specifically, would removing the motivation to regulate 
reverse the collapse of compassion? At the beginning of the experiment, participants were 
shown images of and given information about one or eight children in Darfur. This preview 
was meant to create a first wave of emotion experience. Participants were then told that later 
in the experiment, they would be asked to report either 1) their feelings toward these children 
or 2) their feelings toward these children and how much money they would be willing to 
donate. These different expectations were designed to create distinct emotion regulation 
motives. When participants expected to have to help, I predicted the collapse of compassion 
pattern: that those who saw one victim would report more compassionate emotion than those 
who saw eight victims. But when participants did not expect to help, I predicted the reverse: 
that those who saw eight victims would report more compassionate emotion than those who 
saw one victim. Put another way, expecting to help would lead people to down-regulate 
emotion toward eight victims. Rather than reflecting an invariant feature of the affect system, 
the collapse of compassion would instead be due to the motivated avoidance of perceived 
high costs. 
Study 1 also investigated three possible indicators of emotion regulation: regulatory 
effort, psychological distance and numbing. I predicted that when participants expected to 
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donate to eight victims, they would try to eliminate their emotional experience. The simplest 
indicator of emotion regulation would be for participants to report having exerted effort and 
regulation. Participants should thus report having exerted more effort and regulation when 
they expected to help eight victims than when they expected to help one victim. 
The distancing account suggests that participants would construe the victims as being 
at a greater psychological distance, and in particular more emotional distance (Williams & 
Bargh, 2008). As an indicator of emotion regulation, distance should track the collapse of 
compassion. Participants who expected to help eight victims would need to show greater 
distance from these victims than would participants who expected to help one victim. 
The numbing account suggests that any emotion regulation process directed toward 
the images of the children would interfere with immediately subsequent emotional 
experience. After the preview phase of the experiment – where participants were informed 
about the Darfur children and told what they would be asked to do later on – they were asked 
to rate their emotions toward a series of unrelated emotion stimuli. For numbing to be an 
effective indicator of emotion regulation, these emotional responses would need to track the 
collapse of compassion. Participants who expected to help eight victims would have to show 
more numbing than those who expected to help one victim. Study 1 included four classes of 
images – sympathetic, positive-valence, negative-valence, and neutral – to examine the scope 
of any numbing effect that might emerge. Numbing toward all classes of emotional images 
would be especially striking, as it would provide evidence for the claim that the affect system 
– in general – is being shut down as part of a motivated emotion regulation process. 
Method 
Participants 
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 One hundred and twenty college students (84 females) from the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill participated for course credit. Data from an additional 15 participants 
was collected on the last day of the academic year. Experimenters noted high rates of off-task 
behavior during this final day, and so these data were excluded from analysis.1 Also excluded 
were data from 2 participants whose responses were more than 2.5 standard deviations below 
the mean on the “Compassion” scale (see below).  
Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to read about one or eight children from Darfur. 
Half of these participants were given the expectation that they would have to report a 
donation amount later in the experiment, whereas the other half were told that they would 
just be asked to rate their emotions toward the children. The critical dependent variable was 
self-reported emotion toward the children as measured by the Compassion scale. 
Procedures 
Participants were seated at individual computer workstations and run in sessions of up 
to six at a time. After an introductory slide, all participants saw the following: “In the West 
Darfur region of Sudan, there has been a civil war raging for the past four years. The 
Sudanese government and allied militias have been in intense conflict with various rebel 
groups. This conflict has resulted in unchecked violence against civilians, who have been 
killed, abducted, or driven from their homes. These civilians suffer from malnutrition, 
unsanitary living conditions, and are at risk for a variety of deadly diseases such as malaria, 
dysentery, and cholera. Here is a picture [are pictures] of one child [eight children] from 
Darfur.” Care was taken not to emphasize any statistical facts about the Darfur crisis that 
                                                          
1
 When these participants were included for analysis, the critical interaction between help request and number 
of victims on compassion was still significant, F(1, 135) = 3.85, p = .05. 
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would undermine emotional response (Small et al., 2007), while presenting a realistic 
description of the situation. Depending upon victim condition, this textual information was 
accompanied by either one child image or eight child images. Each image was accompanied 
by a fictional name and age. Participants in the one victim condition always saw the same 
child image (“Daoud”). These images were drawn from online sources and can be seen in 
Figure 1. The image(s) and text were on screen for one minute. 
After this point, participants were given the donation manipulation. In the donation 
condition, they were told the following: “Later in the experiment, you will be asked to rate 
your emotions toward this child [these children] and report how much money you would be 
willing to donate. You will now proceed to the next part of the experiment, which involves 
rating how you feel toward a series of images. Remember that later in the experiment, you 
will be asked to rate how you feel toward the child [children] you saw and how much you 
would be willing to donate.” In the no donation condition, they were told the following: 
“Later in the experiment, you will be asked to rate your emotions toward this child [these 
children]. You will now proceed to the next part of the experiment, which involves rating 
how you feel toward a series of images. Remember that later in the experiment, you will be 
asked to rate how you feel toward the child [children] you saw.”  
Participants were then asked to rate their emotional responses toward a series of 
twelve unrelated images (see Figure 2). The images were presented in random order, and for 
each image participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt the following five 
emotions (on a 7-point Likert-type scale from 1 = Not at all to 7 = Extremely): happiness, 
amusement, disgust, sadness, and sympathy. There were four categories of images, 
represented by three images each: positive-valence, negative-valence, sympathetic, and 
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neutral-valence. Ten of these images were drawn from the International Affect Picture 
System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999). The other two images (“Sad Dog” and 
“Sad Child”) were drawn from online sources. The ten images from the IAPS were chosen to 
be clearly positive or negative in their respective valence. The normed pleasantness ratings 
for the unpleasant images, on a scale from 1 (very unpleasant) to 9 (very pleasant), were as 
follows: Roach (2.46), Bomb (2.96), and Ship (2.48). Ratings for pleasant images were: 
Money (7.91), Puppies (8.34), and Ski (7.57). Ratings for neutral images are: Hammer 
(4.95), Hydrant (5.24), and Lamp (4.87). And for the one sympathetic image from IAPS: 
Soldier (2.21).  
Participants then saw the same Darfur information and image(s) from earlier for a 
period of one minute. Participants then completed a nine-item “Compassion” scale (7-point 
Likert-type from 1 = Not at all to 7 = Extremely) measuring help-related feelings toward the 
target(s) of aid: 1) How sympathetic do you feel toward the child [children]? 2) How warm 
do you feel toward the child [children]? 3) How compassionate do you feel toward the child 
[children]? 4) How touched were you by the child [children]? 5) How urgent do the needs of 
the child [children] in Darfur seem? 6) To what extent do you feel that it is appropriate to 
give money to aid the child [children]? 7) How much do you value the welfare of the child 
[children] whose picture(s) you saw? 8) How important is it to you that this child [these 
children] whose picture(s) you saw be happy? 9) How important is it to you that this child 
[these children] whose picture(s) you saw not suffer? Some of these items were drawn from 
past research (Dunn & Ashton-James, 2008; Small et al., 2007). At this point, participants in 
the donation condition were then asked the following: “How much money would you be 
willing to donate toward this child [these children] at this moment?  Please type your answer 
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into the box below, on a scale ranging from $0 to $25.” Participants in the no donation 
condition were not asked this question. Hypothetical donation was chosen rather than actual 
donation because it has proven effective and psychologically realistic in previous work 
(Kogut & Ritov, 2005). 
Participants then completed an eight-item “Distance” scale (7-point Likert-type scale 
from 1 = Not at all to 7 = Extremely): 1) How close do you feel to the child [children] in 
Darfur? (reverse-coded) 2) How distant do you feel from the child [children] in Darfur? 3) 
To what extent do you feel like you are physically far away from the child [children] in 
Darfur? 4) How much do you feel like the child [children] in Darfur is [are] all the way 
across the world? 5) To what extent do you feel personally invested in the child [children] in 
Darfur? (reverse-coded) 6) To what extent do you feel a social connection to the child 
[children] in Darfur? (reverse-coded) 7) To what extent do you feel emotionally connected to 
the child [children] in Darfur? (reverse-coded) 8) How emotionally distant do you feel from 
the child [children] in Darfur? 
Participants completed four questions measuring regulatory effort (7-point Likert-
type from 1 = Not at all to 7 = Extremely): 1) Has this experiment been emotionally difficult 
for you? 2) Did you find that this experiment was tiring? 3) Did you feel like the experiment 
required a lot of effort to get through? 4) Did you find yourself trying to eliminate your 
emotions when you read about the situation in Darfur?  
This was followed by a series of smaller scales measuring alternative motives for 
engaging in emotion regulation (all were 7-point Likert-type from 1 = Not at all to 7 = 
Extremely). Participants completed two questions measuring diffusion of responsibility: 1) 
How much do you feel it is your moral responsibility to help the child [children] in Darfur? 
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2) How much do you feel that others are responsible for helping the child [children] in 
Darfur? Participants completed two questions measuring perceived efficacy: 1) Do you think 
you would be effective in helping the child [children] in Darfur? 2) Do you think you would 
make a difference in helping the child [children] in Darfur? Participants completed two items 
measuring habituation to televised appeals for aid: 1) How often have you seen images of 
children in appeals for aid on TV? 2) To what extent do you feel accustomed to appeals for 
aid that use images of children? Participants were then asked a manipulation check question 
for the donation manipulation: How much did you expect us to ask you to donate money later 
in the experiment? Finally, participants were asked about their race and gender, and 
additional questions that will not be examined here. 
 Upon completing the experiment, participants were debriefed, provided with the 
opportunity to ask questions or express concerns, and thanked for their time. 
Results 
Manipulation check. A 2-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to 
examine the effects of help request and number of victims on the item measuring expectation 
of help request. Subjects expected to help more in the help request condition (M = 2.80, SD 
= 2.12) than in the no request condition (M = 2.25, SD = 1.80), but this difference did not 
reach significance, F(1, 120) = 2.31, p = .13, η2 = .02. There were no other effects.  
Compassion scale. Does the expectation of having to help create the collapse of 
compassion? The 9 items of the compassion scale were averaged together (Cronbach’s α = 
.81). A 2-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of help 
request and number of victims on compassion. There were no significant main effects of help 
request, F(1, 120) = 1.15, p = .29, η2 = .01, or number of victims, F(1, 120) = .34, p = .56, η2 
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= .00. However, there was a significant interaction between help request and number of 
victims, F(1, 120) = 4.61, p = .03, η2 = .04. The pattern of means for compassion by help 
request and number of victims is displayed in Figure 4. This interaction suggests that the 
difference in compassion toward one versus eight victims depends upon whether one expects 
to be asked to help those victims.  
This significant interaction was probed using simple effects tests. The first way to 
probe these simple effects is to examine the effect of number of victims on compassion 
separately in the help request and no help request conditions. In the no help request 
condition, eight victims elicited significantly more compassion than one victim, F(1, 59) = 
3.87, p = .05, η2 = .06. In the help request condition, however, the number of victims had no 
significant effect on compassion, F(1, 61) = 1.18, p = .28, η2 = .02. The second way to probe 
these simple effects is to examine the effect of help request on compassion separately in the 
one-victim and eight-victim conditions. In the one-victim condition, there was not a 
significant effect of help request on compassion, F(1, 60) = .47, p = .50, η2 = .01. In the 
eight-victim condition, by contrast, subjects reported significantly greater compassion when 
they would not be asked to help than when they would be asked to help, F(1, 60) = 6.76, p = 
.01, η2 = .10.  
These analyses suggest that the collapse of compassion depends on the expectation of 
having to help. The first analysis shows that when participants did not think that they would 
have to help, they reported greater levels of compassion toward eight victims than toward 
one victim. But when they thought they would have to help, this pattern flipped and the 
collapse of compassion emerged (though it did not reach significance). Moreover, the second 
analysis shows that adding a help request did not impact levels of compassion toward one 
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victim, but it dramatically reduced levels of compassion toward eight victims. Together, 
these patterns support the basic hypothesis that the collapse of compassion is motivated by 
perceived cost. 
Subsequent analyses focused on three possible indicators of emotion regulation: 
numbing of unrelated emotional experience, psychological distance from the victims, and 
self-reported regulatory effort. Finally, three alternative motivational explanations for the 
collapse of compassion were examined: diffusion of responsibility, perceived self-efficacy of 
helping, and habituation to aid appeals. 
Emotion numbing. If this collapse of compassion was driven by emotion regulation, 
then this regulation might have bled over and numbed other emotion experience (Mikels et 
al., 2008). Emotional numbing would thus serve as an indicator of emotion regulation. 
Participants reported five different emotions (happiness, amusement, sadness, sympathy, and 
disgust) toward four different kinds of images (positive, negative, sympathetic, and neutral). 
Seven analyses were reported in increasing order of specificity: (1) all emotions toward all 
image types; (2) negative emotions toward all image types; (3) negative emotions toward 
negative emotional images; (4) negative emotions toward positive emotional images; (5) 
negative emotions toward sympathetic images; (6) sympathy toward all image types; and (7) 
sympathy toward sympathetic images. The first analysis asked the most general question of 
whether motivated emotion regulation would lead to a generalized shut-down of emotion 
experience. Subsequent analyses asked more targeted questions. Emotion regulation might 
cause reduction of negative emotions toward all image types, or more modestly, toward just 
negative, positive, or sympathetic emotional images. This would suggest a bleed-over of 
emotion regulation onto unrelated emotions. And emotion regulation might cause reduced 
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sympathy toward all image types, or just toward sympathetic images. This would indicate a 
bleed-over of emotion regulation onto other instances of the same sympathetic emotion. 
Importantly, I predicted that these numbing effects would track the collapse of compassion. 
Subjects who expected to help eight victims would show the least emotional experience 
toward unrelated images. 
The first analysis averaged together all emotional responses toward all image types, 
as a general index of emotional response (60 items total; Cronbach’s α = .90). People who 
expected to help showed reduced overall emotion toward the unrelated images, though this 
effect was only marginally significant, F(1, 120) = 3.50, p = .06, η2 = .03. Number of 
victims, on the other hand, did not significantly influence emotional response, F(1, 120) = 
.23, p = .64, η2 = .02. Finally, there was a marginally significant interaction between help 
request and number of victims, F(1, 120) = 2.83, p = .10, η2 = .02. Figure 5 displays the 
pattern of means by help request and number of victims. This interaction was probed by 
examining the effect of help request on emotional response for participants in the one-victim 
and eight-victim conditions, respectively. For participants in the eight-victim condition, there 
was not a significant effect of help request, F(1, 60) = .02, p = .90, η2 = .00. But for 
participants in the one-victim condition, help request did significantly reduce overall 
emotional response, F(1, 60) = 6.79, p = .01, η2 = .11. Contrary to the hypothesis, expecting 
to help one victim led to numbed emotions toward unrelated images, whereas expecting to 
help eight victims did not have this effect.  
The next analysis focused more specifically on negative emotional responses (average 
of disgust and sadness) to all images. People who expected to help showed less negative 
emotion toward all of the unrelated images, F(1, 120) = 6.15, p = .02, η2 = .05. There was no 
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effect of number of victims, F(1, 120) = .76, p = .38, η2 = .01, but there was a marginally 
significant interaction between help request and number of victims, F(1, 120) = 3.13, p = .08, 
η
2 
= .03. In the eight-victim condition, there was no effect of help request, F(1, 60) = .25, p = 
.62, η2 = .00. But in the one-victim condition, there was such an effect, F(1, 60) = 9.22, p = 
.004, η2 = .14. Expecting to help one victim led to reduced negative emotions toward all 
image types, but expecting to help eight victims did not. This pattern was similar to that for 
overall emotion toward all image types. 
The third analysis examined negative emotional responses just toward negative 
emotional images (“Bomb”, “Roach”, and “Ship”). There were no main effects of help 
request, F(1, 120) = 1.62, p = .21, η2 = .01, or number of victims, F(1, 120) = .60, p = .44, η2 
= .01, nor was there any interaction, F(1, 120) = 1.05, p = .31, η2 = .01. Emotion regulation 
did not numb negative emotion toward specifically negative images. Notably, this finding 
stood in contrast to the effects for negative emotion toward all image types, suggesting that 
the latter effect might have been driven by changes in negative emotion toward other types of 
images. 
The fourth analysis thus examined negative emotional responses toward positive 
emotional images (“Money”, “Puppies”, and “Ski”). People who expected to help showed a 
marginally significant decrease in negative emotion compared to those who did not expect to 
help, F(1, 120) = 2.91, p = .09, η2 = .03. Number of victims did not significantly influence 
negative emotion toward positive images, F(1, 120) = 1.56, p = .21, η2 = .01, nor was there a 
significant interaction between help request and number of victims, F(1, 120) = .58, p = .45, 
η
2 
= .01. Expecting to help caused some decrease in negative emotions toward positive 
images.  
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The next analysis looked at negative emotional responses toward the final class of 
valenced images, sympathetic images (“Soldier”, “Sad Child”, and “Sad Dog”). Expecting to 
help significantly reduced negative emotion toward sympathetic images F(1, 120) = 6.10, p 
= .02, η2 = .05. There was not any effect of number of victims, F(1, 120) = .26, p = .61, η2 = 
.00, but there was a significant interaction between help request and number of victims, F(1, 
120) = 4.22, p = .04, η2 = .04. This interaction was probed by examining the effect of help 
request on negative emotional response for participants in the one-victim and eight-victim 
conditions, respectively. For participants in the eight-victim condition, there was not a 
significant effect of help request on negative emotion, F(1, 60) = .10, p = .76, η2 = .00. But 
for participants in the one-victim condition, expecting to help significantly decreased 
negative emotion toward sympathetic images, F(1, 60) = 9.36, p = .003, η2 = .14. In 
summary, the overall effect for negative emotion toward all image types appears to have 
been driven primarily by the more specific effect of reduced negative emotion toward 
sympathetic images.  
Moving to a different kind of emotion, the sixth analysis focused on sympathy 
responses toward all images. There were no main effects of help request, F(1, 120) = .88, p = 
.35, η2 = .01, or number of victims, F(1, 120) = .07, p = .80, η2 = .00, nor was there any 
interaction, F(1, 120) = .99, p = .32, η2 = .01. Even if participants down-regulated their 
sympathy and compassion toward multiple victims, this did not appear to generalize to other 
instances of the same emotion. 
Finally, the last analysis looked at sympathy toward sympathetic images (“Soldier”, 
“Sad Child”, and “Sad Dog”). There were no main effects of help request, F(1, 120) = .73, p 
= .40, η2 = .01, or number of victims, F(1, 120) = .20, p = .66, η2 = .00, nor was there any 
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interaction, F(1, 120) = .36, p = .55, η2 = .00. So even if participants were eliminating their 
compassion toward multiple victims, it did not carry over and numb sympathy toward 
sympathy-inducing images. This finding mirrored the pattern of sympathy toward all images. 
Thus far, results suggest that expecting to have to help led to a generalized numbing 
of other emotional experience. Yet more specific analyses revealed a more complex picture. 
Rather surprisingly, there was not a numbing effect for sympathy, either in general or 
specific to the sympathetic images. And whereas there was a numbing effect for negative 
emotions in general, there was a not a specific effect of negative emotions toward negative 
images in particular. Instead, this effect for negative emotions was driven by a reduction of 
negative emotions toward sympathetic images. Perhaps more importantly, the pattern for 
overall emotional experience did not fully track the collapse of compassion. The compassion 
pattern was driven by people reducing compassion specifically when they expected to help 
eight victims. The overall numbing pattern was driven by people reducing emotions 
regardless of number of victims. And more specific numbing patterns were driven by people 
reducing emotions when they expected to help one victim. Thus, emotion numbing may play 
a part in the collapse of compassion, but it cannot explain the full pattern. 
Psychological distance. As the first indicator of emotion regulation, emotion numbing 
did not turn out as expected. The second indicator of emotion regulation was the 
psychological distance scale (Cronbach’s α = .83), which measured participants’ felt distance 
from the victims they had seen. Participants who down-regulated their compassion toward 
multiple victims might have ended up showing more distance from these victims. I predicted 
that psychological distance would track the collapse of compassion: when participants 
expected to help, they would show greater distance from eight victims than from one victim. 
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Contrary to prediction, there were no significant main effects of help request, F(1, 
120) = .01, p = .94, η2 = .00, or number of victims, F(1, 120) = .00, p = .96, η2 = .00, and no 
significant interaction effect, F(1, 120) = .33, p = .57, η2 = .00. Mean values for distance by 
help request and number of victims are located in Table 1. Distance from the victims did not 
track the collapse of compassion; so even if participants regulated their emotions, distance 
was not an effective indicator of this process. 
Effort. After emotion numbing and psychological distance, the final indicator of 
emotion regulation was the 4-item Effort scale (Cronbach’s α = .60), which measured 
participants’ perceptions of their own effort, regulation, fatigue, and the emotional difficulty 
of the experiment. To act as an indicator for emotion regulation, effort would have to be the 
mirror image of the collapse of compassion. Participants would have to display the most 
effort when they expected to help eight victims.  
There were no significant main effects of help request, F(1, 120) = .93, p = .34, η2 = 
.01, or number of victims, F(1, 120) = .64, p = .42, η2 = .01. There was, however, a 
significant interaction effect, F(1, 120) = .46, p = .04, η2 = .04. Figure 6 displays the pattern 
of means by help request and number of victims. Simple effects analyses revealed that 
whereas there was no significant effect of help request in the one-victim condition, F(1, 60) = 
.60, p = .44, η2 = .01, help request did significantly increase perceptions of effort in the eight-
victim condition, F(1, 60) = 5.62, p = .02, η2 = .09. Probed the other way, there was not a 
significant effect of number of victims in the no help request condition, F(1, 59) = .81, p = 
.37, η2 = .01, but number of victims did increase perceptions of effort in the help request 
condition, F(1, 61) = 4.72, p = .03, η2 = .07. In short, perceived regulatory effort was highest 
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when participants expected to have to help eight victims, further supporting the inference that 
motivated emotion regulation drives the collapse of compassion. 
Further analyses examined the relationship between effort and the collapse of 
compassion. If effort was a proxy for motivated emotion regulation – if self-reported 
regulatory effort tracked actual emotion regulation in the face of victims – then it could have 
been responsible for changes in compassion ratings. Yet a Sobel test revealed that effort did 
not mediate the effect of help request and number of victims on compassion, Z =1.31, p = 
.19. On the other hand, the impact of help request and number of victims on compassion 
might have mediated the effect on effort. Participants engaging in motivated emotion 
regulation might have noticed themselves doing so, inferring the most regulatory effort when 
they expected to help eight victims. Such an effect could also reflect post hoc justification, 
with participants having used effort as an excuse for the reduction in compassion toward 
eight victims in need of help. Yet this Sobel test was not significant, Z =-1.30, p = .19. The 
findings for compassion and effort appear to have been independent phenomena. Even so, 
there was an interesting parallel: participants reported the most regulatory effort when they 
expected to help eight victims, and the collapse of compassion was driven by participants 
reducing their emotions toward eight victims they expected to help. 
In summary, there were mixed findings across three indicators of emotion regulation. 
Though expecting to help one victim caused numbing of unrelated emotions, this effect did 
not track the collapse of compassion. Contrary to prediction, psychological distance from the 
victims was not influenced by how many victims there were or whether help was requested. 
Finally, participants reported the most regulatory effort when they expected to help eight 
victims – a condition which should have been seen as especially costly – and which tracked 
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the simple effects analysis of the compassion findings. The next set of analyses investigated 
alternative motivations for engaging in emotion regulation. 
Diffusion of responsibility. Were the compassion findings driven by perceptions of 
high cost, or by other motives? The first alternative considered here was diffusion of 
responsibility. Participants might have felt less morally responsible for helping eight victims 
than for helping one victim. But when the expectation to help was lifted – when 
responsibility did not have to translate into action – they might have felt less morally 
responsible for helping one victim than for helping eight. This line of argument is very 
similar to the argument developed for the role of high cost in motivating emotion regulation. 
There were 2 items on the Diffusion scale (r = .48) measuring perceived personal 
responsibility to help and perceived responsibility of others to help. To compute diffusion of 
responsibility, participants’ personal responsibility scores were subtracted from their scores 
for the responsibility of others. A higher score reflected a greater diffusion of responsibility. 
There were not significant main effects of help request, F(1, 120) = 1.10, p = .30, η2 = .01, or 
number of victims, F(1, 120) = 1.06, p = .31, η2 = .01, and there was no significant 
interaction effect, F(1, 120) = .78, p = .38, η2 = .01. Mean values for diffusion of 
responsibility by help request and number of victims are located in Table 1. Diffusion of 
responsibility did not change depending upon whether help was expected or the number of 
victims involved. Compassion, on the other hand, was influenced by these factors, suggesting 
that diffusion of responsibility did not play a prominent role in the collapse of compassion. 
Efficacy. Another alternative motivation was perceived self-efficacy, which was 
measured by the 2-item Efficacy scale (r = .60). One common justification for failing to help 
is that any help would just be a “drop in the bucket”, and that it would not make a substantive 
 32   
 
difference to the lives of those in need. Participants might have down-regulated their 
emotions because these emotions were seen as useless, leading to the collapse of compassion. 
Were this the case, there would have to be a similar pattern for efficacy as for the compassion 
findings. Yet there were not significant main effects of help request, F(1, 120) = 1.10, p = 
.30, η2 = .01, or number of victims, F(1, 120) = .70, p = .70, η2 = .01, and there was not a 
significant interaction effect, F(1, 120) = .23, p = .63, η2 = .00. Mean values for efficacy by 
help request and number of victims are located in Table 1. Perceived self-efficacy did not 
change when help was requested or by the number of victims involved, suggesting that it was 
not the motivation behind the collapse of compassion.  
Habituation. The last motivational alternative was habituation, or how often and 
accustomed participants felt to appeals for aid. This was measured by the 2-item Habituation 
scale (r = .15). Participants might be expected to be most habituated to appeals for aid 
involving multiple children, like the kinds of appeals seen on television advertisements. 
Assuming that habituation leads people to either feel less or more often engage in motivated 
emotion regulation, then habituation would have to show the mirror image pattern of the 
compassion findings: more habituation toward one victim than toward eight victims when 
help was not expected, and more habituation toward  eight victims than one victim when help 
was expected. Yet there were no significant main effects of help request, F(1, 120) = .24, p = 
.62, η2 = .00, or number of victims, F(1, 120) = .39, p = .53, η2 = .00, and there was not a 
significant interaction effect, F(1, 120) = 1.19, p = .28, η2 = .01. Mean values by help request 
and number of victims are located in Table 1. Habituation to appeals for aid was not 
impacted by an actual appeal for aid or by changing the number of victims. This suggests that 
changes in habituation were not responsible for the collapse of compassion. With three 
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alternative motivational explanations having been dispatched, it now seems safer to say that 
the collapse of compassion was driven by the perception of high cost.  
Discussion 
Does the collapse of compassion emerge when people see their emotions as 
potentially costly? When participants in the current study did not think they would have to 
help, they did not show the collapse of compassion. Instead, they showed greater compassion 
toward eight victims than toward one victim. But when they did think they would have to 
help, the collapse of compassion emerged. It appears that the collapse of compassion can be 
turned on and off, simply by changing whether people expect to have to help. Contrary to 
previous assumptions, the collapse of compassion might not be due to aggregates’ inability to 
trigger emotion (Slovic, 2007). Rather, it might be due to an active attempt to eliminate 
emotions that are seen as costly. Moreover, this reversal was due to changes in compassion 
toward eight victims, rather than by changes in compassion toward one victim, suggesting 
that compassion toward eight victims was seen as especially costly when help was expected.
 This inference is bolstered in light of the finding for regulatory effort. When people 
expected to have to help eight victims, they reported having exerted the most effortful 
regulation. These people should have had the highest motivation to reduce their emotions 
because of the high psychological and financial cost involved. As mentioned, the compassion 
effect described above was driven by people reducing compassion toward eight victims (but 
not changing their compassion toward one victim) when they expected to have to help them. 
If regulation was engaged in this situation, then it comes as no surprise that people who 
expected to help eight victims reported the most regulation, effort, and fatigue. However, 
because effort did not mediate compassion, this indicator of regulation is not responsible for 
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the compassion effect. And because compassion did not mediate effort, the compassion effect 
is not responsible for self-reported effort, through a process like self-inference or self-
justification. Rather, the effects on compassion and on regulatory effort appear to be 
independent phenomena. Even so, they both highlight the fact that regulation may play a role 
in the collapse of compassion. 
Regulation can also be inferred from its effects on subsequent emotional experience. 
People who expected to have to help reduced their overall emotional experience toward 
unrelated images. Even if this numbing indicated regulation, it did not explain the 
compassion effect. The collapse of compassion was driven by people eliminating emotions 
toward eight victims they expected to help, whereas the overall effect for emotion numbing 
was not influenced by the number of victims involved. And although more specific analyses 
– such as negative emotional responses to sympathy-inducing images – suggested that 
number of victims did have an influence, it was in the wrong direction, with reduced emotion 
when subjects expected to help one victim. Although these outcomes are theoretically 
interesting, they fail to fully explain the collapse of compassion. 
Finally, and critical for the current investigation, the compassion effect was not 
driven by diffusion of responsibility, perceived efficacy of helping, or habituation to aid 
appeals. Perceived high cost, rather than these alternative motives, appears to be the critical 
impetus behind the collapse of compassion.
 CHAPTER 7 
STUDY 2 
 
 Study 1 has shown that motivated emotion regulation might have a very important 
role to play in the collapse of compassion. When people expected to help, there was the 
typical collapse of compassion between one and eight victims. When this expectation was 
removed, the collapse reversed, as people experienced more compassion toward eight than 
toward one. Moreover, the finding for regulatory effort provided additional support that 
regulation is relevant to the collapse of compassion. Study 2 was meant to further bolster the 
argument that motivated emotion regulation drives the collapse of compassion, by exploring 
two potential moderators of the regulation process: time course and skill at regulation.  
 The current study differed from Study 1 in a number of ways. Instead of just 
measuring emotion toward one and eight victims, Study 2 included a four-victim condition to 
allow for a finer grain of analysis. The current study also did not manipulate whether 
participants expected to help. Rather, all participants expected to report a donation amount. 
Holding this expectation constant allowed for a more detailed investigation of the regulation 
process involved in the previous study. For instance, emotion regulation is a process that 
unfolds over time (Greene et al., 2001; Koole, 2009). Yet no studies have examined the time 
course of affective responses as they relate to the collapse of compassion. To gain more 
insight into the time course of affective responses, Study 2 used an online rating scale to 
measure emotion changes over time (Larsen & Fredrickson, 1999). If the collapse of 
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compassion is driven by motivated emotion regulation, then the difference in emotion by 
number of victims should become stronger over time, as participants alter the trajectory of 
their emotions toward multiple victims. I therefore predicted an interaction between number 
of victims and time of online emotion rating. In a manner of speaking, regulation would be 
caught in the act. 
 If the collapse of compassion is the end product of a motivated strategy to avoid high 
financial and psychological costs, then people who are skilled at regulating their emotions 
should be especially likely to show this effect. People who cannot regulate their emotions 
well should not show the effect as strongly. In short, I predicted a three-way interaction 
between number of victims, time of online emotion rating, and skill at emotion regulation. 
The collapse of compassion should only emerge over time for people who can regulate their 
emotions well. Finally, whether or not people engage in motivated emotion regulation might 
depend upon their trait levels of interpersonal sensitivity (e.g. Graziano et al., 2007; Reed et 
al., 2009). People who are highly attuned to the plight of others might not engage in 




Sixty college students (49 females) from the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill participated for course credit. Data was excluded from one participant whose response 
was more than 2.5 standard deviations below the mean on the tenth time interval of the 
online emotion rating. 
Design 
 37   
 
Participants were randomly assigned to read about one, four, or eight children from 
Darfur. There was an additional between-subjects factor of regulation ability as assessed by 
two measures (see below), and a within-subjects factor of time of online emotion rating. The 
critical dependent variable was the content of the online emotion rating. 
Procedures 
Participants were seated at individual computer workstations. Participants then read 
the following: “The purpose of this experiment is to look at emotional reactions over time. 
You will be asked to record your emotions in real time, moment by moment. You will see an 
image of and information about a child [children]. This child lives [these children live] in the 
war-torn and disease-ridden West Darfur region of Sudan.” They were then told about the 
online emotion rating scale:  
“Once you see this child [these children], please use the sliding rating scale at the 
bottom of the screen to rate how upset you feel for the child [children]. This sliding 
scale can be moved continuously so that you can report changes in how upset you feel 
over time. The slide can move from 1 on the left (Not at all upset) to 11 on the right 
(Extremely upset). You can move the scale using the arrow keys on the keyboard 
(marked in orange). Please note that each section on the scale corresponds to a 
specific level of emotion. Any time you notice your feelings change, please move the 
scale accordingly. Please adjust the sliding scale as often as necessary so that it 
reflects how you are currently feeling.” 
After this, participants were shown a screen with the online rating scale: “Please take 
a minute to practice using the sliding scale to get acquainted with how it works. Remember 
to move the scale as often as necessary so that it reflects how you are currently feeling. Let 
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the experimenter know if you have any questions.” Note that this online emotion rating scale 
provided a continuous measure of emotion over time. Though the measure was scaled from 1 
(Not at all upset) to 11 (Extremely upset), it allowed for continuous responses (to two 
decimal places) between the whole numbers. This measure automatically took ten samples 
per second, and averaged them together to provide a response for each second of time. 
After having one minute to practice with the scale, participants were told the 
following: “After this part of the experiment, you will be asked some questions, as well as 
how much you would be willing to donate toward the child [the children].” Finally, they 
were given one last set of instructions: “On the next page, you will read information about 
the West Darfur region of Sudan, and see a picture [pictures] of a child that lives [children 
that live] in Darfur. As you read this information, immediately begin using the arrow keys on 
the computer to start rating how upset you feel for the children. Remember to adjust the 
sliding scale as often as necessary to match how upset you feel, moment to moment.”  
Participants then saw a screen containing information about the crisis in Darfur, as 
well as images of one, four, or eight children from Darfur. In the multiple-victim conditions, 
these child images were presented simultaneously. These were the same images and text used 
in Study 1, located in Appendix A. Participants in the one-victim condition all saw the image 
of “Daoud”, and participants in the four-victim condition all saw images of “Daoud”, 
“Abakar”, “Rokia”, and “Ibrahim.” Also on screen were two warnings in bright green: 
“Begin rating your feelings now!” at the very top and “Please remember to keep rating your 
feelings!” underneath the child image(s). The online emotion rating scale was at the very 
bottom of the screen. All of this was presented on screen for the course of one minute, before 
advancing automatically. Participants were then asked the same open-ended hypothetical 
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donation question from Study 1. Participants then moved on to complete a series of 
individual difference measures. 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Appendix C). This 
36-item scale measures various aspects of general emotion regulation ability. I predicted that 
participants scoring low on this scale – who were skilled at emotion regulation – would show 
the collapse of compassion over time. On the other hand, those who scored high on this scale 
– who were poor emotion regulators – would not show this collapse. 
Distress Tolerance Scale (Simons & Gaher, 2005; Appendix D). This 15-item scale 
measures the more specific ability to tolerate and regulate negative psychological states. As 
another measure of emotion regulation ability, I predicted a similar pattern: that those who 
scored high on this scale – who were able to cope with distress well – would show the 
collapse of compassion over time. In contrast, those scoring low on this scale – who were 
poor at coping with distress – would not show this collapse.  
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983; Appendix E). Participants received the 
Empathic Concern and Personal Distress sub-scales (14 items total) of the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index. Empathic concern measures the tendency to experience feelings of warmth 
and compassion for others undergoing negative experiences, and personal distress measures 
the tendency to experience discomfort and anxiety in response to others’ negative 
experiences. I predicted that only participants who scored low on these measures would show 
the collapse of compassion over time. People who are highly attuned to others might not 
engage in motivated emotion regulation to avoid their emotions. 
Finally, participants were asked about their race, gender, and other questions that will 
not be discussed here. 
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Results 
Online emotion rating. If the collapse of compassion was driven by emotion 
regulation, then the differences in emotion toward one, four, and eight victims should have 
become stronger over time. Participants made emotion ratings on the sliding scale over the 
course of one minute. For each second of time the average emotional response was recorded, 
providing sixty data points for each participant. For the current analysis, these sixty data 
points were parsed into ten intervals representing the average emotional response over every 
consecutive six seconds of time (e.g. seconds 1 through 6, seconds 7 through 12, etc.) 
To examine whether the collapse of compassion emerged over time, time of online 
emotion rating was entered as a within-subjects factor in a repeated-measures ANOVA with 
content of emotion rating as the dependent variable. Number of victims was entered as a 
between-subjects factor. There was a significant main effect of time of online emotion rating, 
F(9, 513) = 39.56, p < .001, η2 = .41. Across groups, participants felt more emotion by the 
end of the online rating than they had at the beginning. There was a significant main effect of 
number of victims, F(2, 57) = 3.97, p = .02, η2 = .12. Across time intervals, the number of 
victims influenced how upset participants felt. Critically, there was a significant interaction 
between time of online emotion rating and number of victims, F(18, 513) = 1.87, p = .02, η2 
= .06. This result suggests that the change in emotion over the course of one minute was 
different depending upon the number of victims. Figure 7 displays this interaction. 
There were two ways to probe this interaction. The first way was to look at changes 
in emotion over time separately for participants in the one-victim, four-victim, and eight-
victim conditions. In the one-victim condition, there was a significant main effect of time of 
online emotion rating, F(9, 171) = 21.26, p < .001, η2 = .53, meaning that emotion increased 
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over the minute interval. Emotion also significantly increased over time in the four-victim 
condition, though not quite as strongly, F(9, 189) = 14.26, p < .01, η2 = .40. And emotion 
significantly increased over time in the eight-victim condition, though not as strongly as in 
the other two conditions, F(9, 153) = 6.96, p < .001, η2 = .29. Emotion significantly increased 
over time for all three conditions, but this effect was clearly strongest for the one-victim 
condition and weakest for the eight-victim condition. Emotions for participants in the eight-
victim condition in particular did not keep pace with participants’ emotions in the one-victim 
condition. Rather, they tapered off in a process consistent with emotion regulation. 
The other way to probe this interaction was to look at the effect of number of victims 
on emotion within each of the ten intervals of time. For the first time interval (the average of 
the first six seconds), there was not a significant main effect of number of victims on 
emotion, F(2, 60) = 1.66, p = .20, η2 = .06. There was no meaningful separation in emotion 
toward one, four, and eight victims. This is not entirely surprising, given that for all 
participants, the scale was initially defaulted at the mid-point. Even so, this first interval was 
the average over six seconds, a moderate amount of time. It was only at the fifth time interval 
(seconds 25 through 30) that the effect of number of victims on emotion became significant, 
F(2, 60) = 3.42, p = .04, η2 = .11. This suggests that it took nearly half a minute for the 
collapse of compassion to emerge across victim groups. This effect only became stronger by 
the tenth and final time interval (seconds 55 through 60), F(2, 60) = 4.23, p = .02, η2 = .13. In 
summary, the collapse of compassion only emerged over time. Because emotion regulation 
takes time, this finding adds further weight to the claim that motivated emotion regulation 
drives the collapse of compassion.  
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Regulation skill. Having successfully established time as the first moderator of the 
collapse of compassion, the second moderator was regulation skill. Only people who could 
effectively regulate their emotions should have shown the collapse of compassion over time. 
The two measures of regulation skill were the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale 
(Cronbach’s α = .92) and the Distress Tolerance Scale (Cronbach’s α = .82). The scales were 
significantly correlated in the expected direction, r = -.65, p < .001. There were not 
significant effects of victim condition on Difficulties in Emotion Regulation, F(2, 60) = .69, 
p = .51, η2 = .02, or on Distress Tolerance, F(2, 60) = 1.25, p = .30, η2 = .04. Means for both 
scales by number of victims are presented in Table 2. Both scales could therefore be used as 
moderators, to examine whether only participants who are skilled at regulation showed the 
collapse of compassion over time. Each scale will be analyzed in turn. 
The first measure of emotion regulation skill was the Difficulties in Emotion 
Regulation Scale. A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with time of online emotion 
rating as a within-subjects factor, number of victims as a between-subjects factor, and 
difficulties in emotion regulation as a continuous covariate. Critically, the three-way 
interaction between these variables was significant, F(18, 486) = 1.68, p = .04, η2 = .06. This 
result suggests that regulation skill moderated whether the collapse of compassion emerged 
over time. 
To probe this interaction, the data were divided into those who were high and low in 
difficulties in emotion regulation. Participants whose average scores fell below the median 
value of 2.11 were classified as skilled regulators, whereas those whose scores fell above this 
point were classified as poor regulators. For participants who were poor regulators, the 
critical interaction between time of online emotion rating and number of victims was not 
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significant, F(18, 243) = .31, p = .99, η2 = .02. Participants who could not regulate their 
emotions well did not show the collapse of compassion over time. For participants who were 
skilled regulators, on the other hand, this interaction was significant, F(18, 243) = 3.38, p < 
.001, η2 = .20. Only people who were able to effectively regulate their emotions showed the 
collapse of compassion over time. Figure 8 displays this interaction between time of online 
emotion rating, number of victims, and regulation skill. 
The other measure of emotion regulation skill was the Distress Tolerance Scale. 
Distress tolerance was tested as a moderator of the time by victim number interaction. 
Critically, the three-way interaction between these variables was significant, F(18, 486) = 
2.43, p = .001, η2 = .08. Distress tolerance moderated whether the collapse of compassion 
emerged over time. 
To probe this interaction, the data were divided into those who were high and low in 
distress tolerance. All participants whose average scores fell below the median value of 3.60 
were classified as low in distress tolerance, whereas those above this point were classified as 
high in distress tolerance. For participants who were low in distress tolerance, the critical 
interaction between time of online emotion rating and number of victims was not significant, 
F(18, 261) = .86, p = .63, η2 = .06. Participants who could not effectively cope with distress 
did not show the collapse of compassion over time. But for participants high in distress 
tolerance, this interaction was significant, F(18, 225) = 4.31, p < .001, η2 = .26. Only people 
who were able to tolerate and regulate distress showed the collapse of compassion over time. 
Figure 9 displays this interaction between number of victims, time of online emotion rating, 
and distress tolerance.  
 44   
 
Together, these results suggest that both time and regulation skill were critical 
moderators of the collapse of compassion. Not only did the collapse of compassion take time 
to develop, but it also required the ability to skillfully regulate emotions. This finding adds 
further support to the role of emotion regulation in the collapse of compassion. 
Interpersonal sensitivity. If the collapse of compassion was due to a motivated 
emotion regulation, then some people might refrain from using this strategy. For example, 
people who were highly sensitive to the plight of others might not have been motivated to 
reduce their affect toward victims, and thus refrained from initiating the collapse of 
compassion. To examine this possibility, the 14 items of the Empathic Concern and Personal 
Distress sub-scales were averaged together (Cronbach’s α = .72). Before testing whether 
interpersonal sensitivity could be a moderator of the collapse of compassion, it was important 
to establish that it was not influenced by the manipulation. Surprisingly, there was a 
significant effect of number of victims, F(2, 60) = 5.42, p = .01, η2 = .16, such that people 
who read about higher numbers of victims considered themselves to be less interpersonally 
sensitive. Post hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD revealed significant differences between the 
one-victim and four-victim conditions, p = .02, and between the one-victim and eight-victim 
conditions, p = .01, but not between the four-victim and eight-victim conditions, p = .97. 
Figure 10 displays interpersonal sensitivity by number of victims. It appears that as the 
number of victims increased, people considered themselves to be less interpersonally 
sensitive. 
If the collapse of compassion was driven by emotion regulation, then people might 
have recognized this active process as it happened. Either by simple self-perception or as a 
way to justify their own self-regulation, participants who saw multiple victims might have 
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inferred that they were less interpersonally sensitive. A mediation analysis was conducted to 
test whether changes in interpersonal sensitivity were driven by differences in online emotion 
toward the victims at the tenth time interval. A Sobel test revealed that the influence of 
number of victims on interpersonal sensitivity was not mediated by online emotion at the 
tenth time interval, Z = 1.47, p = .14. Even though number of victims influenced 
interpersonal sensitivity, this effect was not due to its impact upon emotion toward the 
victims. 
Discussion 
 If the collapse of compassion is driven by motivated emotion regulation, then its 
emergence should depend on two key moderators: time and skill at regulation. Study 2 
showed that the difference in rated emotion between one, four, and eight victims only 
emerged over time, and this only for people who could effectively regulate their emotions.  
 Emotion regulation is a process that unfolds over time. If the expectation to help leads 
to the collapse of compassion through emotion regulation, then it should take time. The 
current study showed that it took nearly half a minute for the differences in emotion toward 
one, four, and eight victims to open up. People who saw one, four, and eight victims all 
increased their emotions over time; but the rate of increase was much lower for higher 
numbers of victims. Cast in terms of regulation, it seems that people simply did not let 
themselves feel as much toward higher numbers of victims. And when looking across victim 
groups, this translated into the collapse of compassion by the end of the online rating. 
Critically, an online measure of emotion was required to catch this regulation in action. It 
might be easy to think that the collapse of compassion is due to fundamental constraints on 
affective processing if the dynamics of emotional experience are ignored. Past studies have 
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only utilized static measures; and even if they captured the collapse of compassion, they 
might have overlooked the critical moderating role of time. They might have captured the 
end result, but missed the intervening process. As the first exploration of affect dynamics in 
relation to the collapse of compassion, this study has shown how it can strengthen the 
argument for motivated emotion regulation. 
 A skeptic might still question the role of regulation in the finding described above. 
Maybe people simply did not have a choice in how their emotions toward one, four, or eight 
victims changed over time. In that case, a qualified affective constraints account – that 
aggregates don’t trigger as much emotion over time – would suffice, rather than requiring the 
turn to motivated emotion regulation. Yet the moderating effect of regulation skill cuts this 
alternative explanation off at the pass. Using two measures of emotion regulation ability, I 
found that only people who could effectively regulate their emotions showed the collapse of 
compassion over time. People who could not regulate their emotions well did not show this 
effect. If the collapse of compassion was just due to constraints on affective processing, then 
regulation skill should not have had an influence. 
 The finding for trait interpersonal sensitivity strengthens this point. Compared to 
those who only expected to help one victim, people who expected to help multiple victims 
reported that they were, generally speaking, less interpersonally sensitive. If people were 
engaging in active emotion regulation, then they might have noticed themselves doing this, 
which would in turn have had some impact on their self-conceptions. Though the effect on 
interpersonal sensitivity was not mediated by the collapse of compassion, it is still 
noteworthy that a self-reported trait measure was sensitive to how many victims were 
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presented. Tentatively, this finding might add one more piece of support to the idea that the 
collapse of compassion is due to motivated emotion regulation. 
 CHAPTER 8 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Why do people’s moral emotions respond less strongly to many suffering victims 
than to one? Though most people predict that they would and should respond with more 
compassion as the number of victims in a crisis increases, in fact their compassion tends to 
plummet. One prominent line of thought would suggest that this collapse of compassion is a 
function of how our affect systems are built (Slovic, 2007). Our emotions are not triggered 
by aggregates, are numerically imprecise, and are easily habituated. Controlled deliberation 
is usually ineffective at correcting these emotional biases (Small et al., 2007), which can in 
turn lead to moral decisions that deviate from normative ideals. And over evolutionary time, 
it was unlikely for humans to have expanded beyond small-group lifestyles, making affective 
tuning toward higher numbers unnecessary and possibly maladaptive (Penner et al., 2005). 
Together, these reasons seem to suggest a seamless account of how the collapse of 
compassion is due to adaptive constraints on affective processing. 
But upon closer examination, this apparent coherence begins to come apart. Most 
obviously, this line of thought fails to explain why there would be a decrease in compassion 
as numbers increase. This decrease suggests something different from a functional limitation; 
instead, it suggests that the collapse of compassion might be driven by down-regulation of 
emotional experience. And if this regulation could be shown to occur when costs are 
especially high, it would suggest further that this is a strategic process instead of a functional 
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default. In two studies, the collapse of compassion seems to have been driven by just such a 
process of motivated emotion regulation. Critically, each study provides multiple pieces of 
evidence which support a motivated emotion regulation account, and which work against the 
affective constraints account described above. Though each finding in itself could be 
challenged by a critic, it is their combined effect that proves especially powerful. 
Study 1 showed that the collapse of compassion is contingent on the expectation of 
having to help. When people did not expect to have to help, they actually did not show the 
collapse of compassion, but instead showed greater compassion toward higher numbers of 
victims. But when they did expect to have to help, this pattern flipped and the collapse of 
compassion emerged. More specifically, this reversal was driven by the reduction of 
compassion toward eight victims, suggesting that expecting to help eight victims was 
perceived as especially costly. Theoretically, this finding suggests that, counter to the 
dominant line of thought on the collapse of compassion, it is not simply a given that people 
feel greater emotion toward single victims than multiple victims. Rather, the collapse of 
compassion might be driven by the motivation to avoid high costs. Practically, this finding 
also suggests the rather counter-intuitive conclusion that an effective way to get rid of the 
collapse of compassion might be to convince people that they will not have to act 
compassionately. 
Additionally, people who expected to help eight children showed the most regulatory 
effort. More than anyone else, they reported regulation, effort, fatigue, and emotional 
difficulty. This finding was not driven by the compassion effect, nor did it lead to the 
compassion effect. Nevertheless, the compassion effect was driven by the reduction of 
compassion toward eight children when help was expected, the same condition that elicited 
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the most self-reported regulatory effort. Having to help eight victims appears to be an 
aversive situation for many people—one that elicits both emotion regulation and its 
perceived after-effects.  
To examine this regulation process more closely, Study 2 held help expectation 
constant and tested two key moderators of emotion regulation: time and regulation skill. If 
regulation takes time, and if the collapse of compassion is driven by regulation, then the 
collapse should develop over time. Using an online measure of affect, Study 2 found that it 
took nearly half a minute for significant differences in emotion toward one, four, and eight 
victims to emerge. Whereas previous studies on the collapse of compassion have all utilized 
static measures of affect, Study 2 was the first to use a dynamic measure in this context. 
Using this measure caught regulation in action, moving beyond the conflation of outcome 
with process. 
Were that not enough, only people who could effectively regulate their emotions 
showed the collapse of compassion over time. This finding held up across two distinct 
measures of emotion regulation ability, and adds further weight to the claim that the collapse 
of compassion is due to the strategic reduction of emotional experience. Skilled regulators 
who expected to have to help four or eight children appear to have accessed and successfully 
implemented an emotion regulation strategy. And if they noticed themselves regulating, that 
might explain why people who saw four and eight victims reported being less interpersonally 
sensitive. Eliminating the moral emotions might lead to a corresponding change in one’s own 
moral self-image, either as a simple read-off of behavior, or perhaps as an excuse for it. 
Summary. These studies have provided the first evidence – across multiple measures 
and multiple methods – that the collapse of compassion might be due to motivated emotion 
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regulation. It only emerges when people expect to have to help, suggesting that motivation is 
relevant. It is conditional on time and regulation skill, suggesting that regulation is relevant. 
And finally, people report more regulatory effort and less interpersonal sensitivity when they 
expect to help higher numbers, suggesting that they might have been aware of engaging in 
emotion regulation and revised their self-conceptions accordingly. Moreover, by only using 
hypothetical donations, the current studies have been rather conservative tests; were real 
money involved, these effects might be even stronger. Slovic (2007) suggested that people 
“turn off” their affect in the face of mass suffering, and the current studies illustrate just what 
that process might be. 
Broader Implications for the Collapse of Compassion 
The extant literature on the collapse of compassion draws upon dual-process theories 
in social cognition to suggest that both intuitive affect and controlled deliberation can 
generate compassionate responses, while conceding that affect is rather biased and 
deliberation rather powerless (Loewenstein & Small, 2007; Slovic, 2007). The typical 
assumption seems to be that the collapse of compassion is due to biased affect run amok, and 
that if only deliberation could be made stronger, everything would be fine. But attempts to 
de-bias affect and bolster deliberative power have had mixed results (Hsee & Rottenschreith, 
2004; Small et al., 2007), leading some to speculate that institutional change is the only 
answer (Slovic, 2007). 
Yet by showing that the collapse of compassion is due to an active process of 
motivated emotion regulation, the current studies have the potential not only to re-frame the 
theoretical debate over what drives the collapse of compassion, but also the practical debate 
over how to eliminate it. If active regulation is the culprit, and not biased gut reactions, then 
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that suggests moving away from paradigms that try to bolster controlled cognitive resources 
(such as Small et al., 2007). Though previous studies have shown that self-regulation is 
required for moral behavior (e.g. DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008), other work 
has shown that controlled resources are required for motivated immoral behavior (Valdesolo 
& DeSteno, 2008). If the collapse of compassion is the latter kind of phenomenon, then 
eliminating rather than bolstering cognitive resources might prove an interesting and 
productive avenue of inquiry. If the reduction of emotion from one to eight victims 
disappears when subjects are placed under a cognitive load manipulation, then it would 
suggest that the emotion regulation process in question is at least partially a controlled one. 
Yet the possibly controlled nature of this regulation process might be less important 
than its motivational sensitivity. All it took to create the collapse of compassion were a few 
words telling people that they would be asked to donate; all it took to reverse this collapse 
was to remove these few words. It is worth emphasizing that this donation request was only 
hypothetical. More importantly, this finding opens up intriguing possibilities for other ways 
to reverse the collapse of compassion. If showing more compassion toward multiple victims 
requires not expecting to help, then any manipulation that removes that expectation might be 
effective. For instance, creating a situation conducive to diffusion of responsibility might in 
fact reverse the collapse of compassion, if it removes any expectation to provide aid. This is 
of no small importance, given that Slovic (2007), Schelling (1968), and others have described 
the collapse of compassion as a social dilemma prone to diffusion of responsibility. But if 
that is the case, then there is a lot of compassion out there not being adequately translated 
into pro-social action. Perhaps the most intriguing research of all would find ways to 
translate compassion that is contingent on not expecting to help into actual helping behavior. 
 CHAPTER 9 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
Causally manipulating regulation. Though the current studies provide convergent 
evidence for the role of motivated emotion regulation in the collapse of compassion, this 
evidence is still indirect. Regulation can be inferred from its effects on compassion and from 
its moderation by cost, time, and regulation skill; but directly manipulating whether 
participants engage in emotion regulation would provide the strongest evidence. For instance, 
participants could be told either to let themselves feel emotion toward either one or eight 
Darfur children, or to prevent themselves from feeling any emotion toward these children. 
Importantly, participants would not be told to engage in different amounts of emotion 
regulation depending on number of victims. Any difference in emotion toward one and eight 
victims, in addition to showing the causal role of regulation, would also reflect participants’ 
spontaneous, motivated modification to the regulation task instructions. If participants who 
were told to regulate their emotions showed the collapse of compassion, it would provide 
direct causal evidence that motivated emotion regulation drives the collapse of compassion.  
Behavioral measures. Because this thesis did not include any behavioral measures of 
pro-social behavior, such as actual donation or charitable giving, it has not ruled out one 
possible alternative explanation. Perhaps people reduce their emotions, not to avoid having to 
help, but so that they are able to help. A number of studies have shown that the ability to 
regulate emotions well predicts a variety of pro-social outcomes (Eisenberg, 2000; 
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Eisenberg, Hofer, & Vaughan, 2007). Perhaps the collapse of compassion does not represent 
a stifling of the moral impulse, but rather adaptive preparation for pro-social action. If this is 
the case, then people should be primed to help others, even if their emotions indicate 
otherwise. The most direct way to address this would be to give participants the chance to act 
compassionately. A more subtle approach could use something like the dot-probe task to 
assess whether people’s attention is captured by morally relevant stimuli. Although this 
empirical possibility does remain open, it seems doubtful, given that the most likely outcome 
of reduced compassion is reduced compassionate behavior (e.g., Kogut & Ritov, 2005). 
Which motive(s)? Having provided some evidence that the collapse of compassion 
depends on motivated emotion regulation, there are still unanswered questions as to the 
motives involved. The current pair of studies hypothesized that the prospect of having to help 
eight victims would seem especially costly for two reasons: 1) expected overwhelming 
emotion in response to higher numbers (Hoffman, 2000) and 2) expected financial cost 
(Shaw et al., 1994). Both motives were hypothesized to feed into the emotion regulation 
process responsible for the collapse of compassion, but the current studies did not explicitly 
measure them or afford a way to disentangle them. Future studies might address this by 
examining people’s expectations about financial cost and emotional intensity when asked to 
help multiple victims. Such forecasts might trigger emotion regulation, explaining the 
discrepancy between people’s predictions about how they would respond to mass suffering 
and their actual emotional responses (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Dunn & 
Ashton-James, 2008; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). 
What kind of regulation? Though regulation appears relevant to the collapse of 
compassion, it is not clear what kind of emotion regulation is taking place. For the current 
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studies, I have assumed a rather standard definition of emotion regulation as the exercise of 
conscious, effortful control over the course of an emotional episode (Fridja, 1986; Fridja, 
2007; Koole, 2009). Yet this kind of regulation includes more specific strategies like re-
appraisal, suppression, and attentional re-direction (Gross, 1998). The apparent success of 
emotion regulation in the current studies casts doubt on suppression, a notoriously ineffective 
strategy (Gross & John, 2003). Though re-appraisal has more often been cited as a tool to 
spark sympathy rather than suppress it (Loewenstein & Small, 2007; Pizarro, 2000), re-
appraisal of the Darfur situation could have rationalized the plight of multiple victims as 
unimportant (but only when help was requested; e.g. Dovidio et al., 1991). Finally, re-
directing attention away from targets of aid has been shown to reduce emotion toward them 
(Dickert & Slovic, 2009). Future research should measure individual differences in these 
conscious emotion regulation strategies (e.g., Gross & John, 2003), as well as individual 
differences that predict effective regulation (Barrett, Gross, Conner, & Benevuto, 2001; 
Eisenberg et al., 1994; Gohm, 2003; Seo & Barrett, 2007; Larsen, 2001; Wranik, Barrett, & 
Salovey, 2007). It is also worth examining the role of implicit, automatic forms of emotion 
regulation that might intersect with chronic goals and motives (Bargh & Williams, 2007; 
Forgas & Ciarrochi, 2002; Koole & Jostmann, 2004; Mauss, Bunge, & Gross, 2007; 
Rothermund, Voss, & Wentura, 2008).  
Moral self-regulation. People did seem to have some awareness of their own emotion 
regulation in the studies presented here, given their reports on regulatory effort and their own 
interpersonal sensitivity. Though neither finding was mediated by changes in emotion, it 
seems like moral emotion regulation and the moral self-concept probably share some 
interesting relationship. You might think that people who spotted themselves regulating 
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would affirm their moral self-images by denying regulatory effort and saying that they were 
more interpersonally sensitive; yet this is not what happened. On a charitable interpretation, 
these outcomes reflect straightforward inferences from behavior; on a more cynical one, 
these outcomes reflect attempts to justify that regulation. Previous research on moral self-
regulation suggests that the moral self-concept exists in a dynamic homeostasis that shifts 
flexibly in the service of self-interest (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009; Tensbrunsel, 
Diekmann, Wade-Benzoni, & Bazerman, 2008; see also Markus & Wurf, 1986). Similarly, 
Koole (2009) has argued that emotion regulation can be person-oriented, directed at 
achieving optimal personal functioning through the balancing of conflicting personal and 
social interests (see also Erber & Erber, 2001). Future research should explore the possible 
role that regulation of the moral self-concept plays in the findings described here. This 
approach might prove especially fruitful, because the mechanisms in the current study – the 
motivated down-regulation of moral emotions under conditions of high cost – could be 
applicable to other contexts in which these emotions are considered undesirable or counter to 
self-interest (such as when social or moral outgroups are suffering; e.g., Cohen, Montoya, & 
Insko, 2006; Harris & Fiske, 2006; Kuntsman & Plant, 2008; Pratto & Glasford, 2008). 
Conclusion 
 What explains the collapse of compassion? The received wisdom suggests that mass 
suffering simply does not elicit powerful emotions, yet this only seems to re-describe the 
phenomenon in need of explanation. Though some have speculated instead that people “turn 
off” their emotions (Hoffman, 2000; Slovic, 2007), these claims do not specify the processes 
involved. The current studies have provided a clearer window into what these processes 
entail, and in turn shown that the collapse of compassion is not simply a functional limit on 
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our emotions. Rather, it appears to be the outcome of a motivated emotion regulation process 
driven by perceived high costs. Having found a provisional answer to this striking normative 
failing, we are left with surprisingly good news. Instead of self-regulation being required to 
enact moral behavior, self-regulation might be required to stifle the moral impulse toward 
multiple victims. Learning how to translate this impulse into action will be the next great 
challenge for researchers who work on the collapse of compassion. 
 
 




Aquino, K., Freeman, D., Reed, A., Felps, W., & Lim, V.K. (2009). Testing a social-
cognitive model of moral behavior: The interactive influence of situations and 
moral identity centrality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 123-
141. 
 
Bargh, J.A., & Williams, L.E. (2007). The case for non-conscious emotion regulation. In  
 J.J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation (pp. 429-445). New York:  
 Guilford. 
 
Barrett, L.F, Gross, J.J., Conner, T., & Benvenuto, M. (2001). Knowing what you're  
 feeling and knowing what to do about it: Mapping the relation between emotion  
 differentiation and emotion regulation. Cognition and Emotion, 15, 713-724. 
 
Batson, C. D. (1990). How social an animal? The human capacity for caring. American  
 Psychologist, 45, 336-346.  
 
Batson, C.D. (1991). The altruism question. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Batson, C.D., Fultz, J., & Schoenrade, P.A. (1987). Distress and empathy: Two  
 qualitatively distinct vicarious emotions with distinct motivational consequences.  
 Journal of Personality, 55, 19-39. 
 
Batson, C.D., O’Quin, K., Fultz, J., Vanderplas, M., & Isen, A.M. (1983). Influence of  
 self-reported distress and empathy on egoistic versus altruistic motivation to help.  
 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 706-718. 
 
Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., DeWall, C. N., & Zhang, L. (2007). How emotion shapes  
 behavior: Feedback, anticipation, and reflection, rather than direct causation. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11, 167-203. 
 
Bushman, B.J., & Anderson, C.A. (2009). Comfortably numb: Desensitizing effects of 
violent media on helping others. Psychological Science, 20, 273-277. 
 
Cialdini, R.B., Brown, S.L., Lewis, B.P., Luce, C., & Neuberg, S.L. (1997).  
 Reinterpreting the empathy-altruism relationship: When one into one equals  
 oneness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 481-494. 
 
Cohen, T.R., Montoya, R.M., & Insko, C.A. (2006). Group morality and intergroup 
relations: Cross-cultural and experimental evidence. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 32, 1559-1572. 
 
Davis, M.H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a  
 59   
 
 multidimensional approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44,  
 113-126. 
 
DeWall, C.N., & Baumeister, R.F. (2006). Alone but feeling no pain: Effects of social  
 exclusion on physical pain tolerance and pain threshold, affective forecasting, and  
 interpersonal empathy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 1-15. 
 
DeWall, C. N., Baumeister, R. F., Gailliot, M. T., & Maner, J. K. (2008). Depletion 
 makes the heart grow less helpful: Helping as a function of self-regulatory energy  
 and genetic relatedness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 1653- 
 1662. 
 
Dickert, S., & Slovic, P. (2009). Attentional mechanisms in the generation of sympathy.  
 Judgment and Decision Making, 4, 297-306. 
 
Dovidio, J.F., Piliavin, J.A., Gaertner, S.L., Schroeder, D.A., & Clark, R.D. (1991). The  
 arousal: cost-reward model and the process of intervention: A review of the  
 evidence. In M. Clark (Ed.), Review of Personality and Social Psychology,  
 Volume 12: Prosocial Behavior (pp. 86-118). London: Sage Publications. 
 
Dunn, E.W., & Ashton-James, C. (2008). On emotional innumeracy: Predicted and actual  
 affective response to grand-scale tragedy.  Journal of Experimental Social  
 Psychology, 44, 692-698. 
 
Eisenberg, N. (2000). Emotion, regulation, and moral development. Annual Review of  
 Psychology, 51, 665-697. 
 
Eisenberg, N., Fabes, R.A., Murphy, B., Karbon, M., Maszk, P., Smith, M., O’Boyle, C.,  
 & Suh, K. (1994). The relations of emotionality and regulation to dispositional  
 and situational empathy-related responding. Journal of Personality and Social  
 Psychology, 66, 776-797. 
 
Eisenberg, N., Hofer, C., & Vaughan, J. (2007). Effortful control and its socioemotional 
consequences. In J.J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation (pp. 307-330). 
New York: Guilford Press. 
 
Erber, M.W., & Erber, R. (2001). The role of motivated social cognition in the regulation  
 of affective states.  In J.P. Forgas (Ed.), Handbook of affect and social cognition,  
 (pp. 275-290). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.  
 
Fetherstonhaugh, D., Slovic, P., Johnson, S. M., & Friedrich, J. (1997). Insensitivity to  
 the value of human life: A study of psychophysical numbing. Journal of Risk and  
 Uncertainty, 14, 283-300.  
 
 60   
 
Forgas, J., & Ciarrochi, J. (2002). On managing moods: Evidence for the role of 
homeostatic cognitive strategies in affect regulation. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 28, 336-345. 
 
Fridja, N. (1986). The emotions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Fridja, N. (2007). The laws of emotion. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Fujita, K., Henderson, M., Eng, J., Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2006). Spatial distance  
 and mental construal of social events. Psychological Science, 17, 278-282. 
 
Gohm, C. (2003). Mood regulation and emotional intelligence: Individual differences. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 594-607. 
 
Gratz, K.L., & Roemer, L. (2004). Multidimensional assessment of emotion regulation  
 and dysregulation: Development, factor structure, and initial validation of the  
 Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale. Journal of Psychopathology and  
 Behavioral Assessment, 26, 41-54. 
 
Graziano, W.G., Habashi, M.M., Sheese, B.E., & Tobin, R.M. (2007). Agreeableness, 
empathy, and helping: A person x situation perspective. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 93, 583-599. 
 
Greene, J.D., Sommerville, R.B., Nystrom, L.E., Darley, J.M., & Cohen, J.D. (2001). An 
fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293, 
2105-2108. 
 
Gross, J.J. (1998). The emerging field of emotion regulation: An integrative review.  
 Review of General Psychology, 2, 271-299. 
 
Gross, J.J. (2002). Emotion regulation: Affective, cognitive, and social consequences.  
 Psychophysiology, 39, 281-291. 
 
Gross, J.J., & John, O. (2003). Individual differences in two emotion-regulation  
 processes: Implications for affect, relationship, and well-being. Journal of  
 Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 348-362. 
 
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to 
moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 814-834. 
 
Hamilton, D.L. & Sherman, S.J. (1996). Perceiving persons and groups. Psychological  
 Review, 103, 336-355.  
 
Hamilton, D.L., Sherman, S.J., & Maddox, K.B. (1999). Dualities and continua: 
Implications for understanding perceptions of persons and groups. In. E. Chaiken 
 61   
 
& Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual-process theories in social psychology (pp. 606-626). 
New York: Guilford. 
 
Harris, L.T., & Fiske, S.T. (2006). Dehumanizing the lowest of the low: Neuro-imaging  
 responses to extreme outgroups. Psychological Science, 17, 847-853. 
 
Henderson, M. D., Fujita, K., Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2006). Transcending the  
 “here”: The effect of spatial distance on social judgment. Journal of Personality  
 and Social Psychology, 91, 845-856. 
 
Hodges, S.D., & Klein, K.J.K. (2001). Regulating the costs of empathy: The price of  
 being human. Journal of Socio-economics, 30, 437-452. 
 
Hoffman, M.L. (2000). Empathy and moral development: Implications for caring and  
 justice. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hsee, C.K., & Rottenschreith, Y. (2004). Music, pandas and muggers: On the affective  
 psychology of value. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 23-30. 
 
Jones, B., & Rachlin, H. (2005). Social discounting. Psychological Science, 17, 283-286. 
 
Kogut, T. & Ritov, I. (2005). The "Identified Victim" effect: An identified group, or just  
 a single individual? Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 18, 157-167. 
 
Koole, S.L. (2009). The psychology of emotion regulation: An integrative review.  
 Cognition and Emotion, 23, 4-41. 
 
Koole, S.L., & Jostmann, N.B. (2004). Getting a grip on your feelings: Effects of action  
 orientation and external demands on intuitive affect regulation. Journal of  
 Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 974-990. 
 
Kuntsman, J.W., & Plant, E.A. (2008). Racing to help: Racial bias in high emergency  
 helping situations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 1499-1510. 
 
Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M., & Cuthbert, B. N. (1999). International affective picture  
 system (IAPS): Technical manual and affective ratings. Gainsville, FL: The  
 Center for Research in Psychophysiology, University of Florida. 
 
Larsen, R.J. (2000). Toward a science of mood regulation. Psychological Inquiry, 11,  
 129-141. 
 
Larsen, R. J. & Fredrickson, B. L. (1999). Measurement issues in emotion research.  In  
 D. Kahneman, E. Diener & N. Schwarz (Eds.), Well-being: Foundations of  
 hedonic psychology (pp. 40-60). New York: Russell Sage.  
 
Levine, M., Prosser, A., Evans, D., & Reicher, S. (2005). Identity and emergency  
 62   
 
 intervention: How social group membership and inclusiveness of group  
 boundaries shape helping behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,  
 31, 443-453.  
 
Loewenstein, G., & Small, D. (2007). The scarecrow and the tin man: The vicissitudes of  
 human sympathy and caring. The Review of General Psychology, 11, 112-126. 
 
Loewenstein, G., Weber, E., Hsee, C. & Welch, N. (2001). Risk as feelings.  
 Psychological Bulletin, 127, 267–286. 
 
Markus, H., & Wurf, E. (1987). The dynamic self-concept: A social psychological  
 perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 299-337. 
 
Mauss, I.B., Bunge, S.A., & Gross, J.J. (2007). Automatic emotion regulation. Social and  
 Personality Psychology Compass, 1, 146-167. 
 
Mikels, J. A., Fredrickson, B. L., Larkin, G. R., Lindberg, C. M., Maglio, S. J., & Reuter- 
 Lorenz, P. (2005). Emotional category data on images from the International  
 Affective Picture System. Behavior Research Methods, 37, 626-630. 
 
Mikels, J.A., Reuter-Lorenz, P.A., Beyer, J.A., Fredrickson, B.L. (2008). Emotion and  
 working memory: Evidence for domain-specific processes for affective  
 maintenance. Emotion, 8, 256-266. 
 
Penner, L.A., Dovidio, J.F., Piliavin, J.A., & Schroeder, D.A. (2005). Prosocial  
 behavior: Multilevel perspectives. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 365-392. 
 
Pizarro, D. (2000). Nothing more than feelings?: The role of emotions in moral judgment.  
 Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 30, 355-375. 
 
Pratto, F., & Glasford, D.E. (2008). Ethnocentrism and the value of a human life. Journal  
 of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 1411-1428. 
 
Rothermund, K., Voss, A., & Wentura, D. (2008). Counter-regulation in affective  
 attentional bias: A basic mechanism that warrants flexibility in motivation and  
 emotion. Emotion, 8, 34-46. 
 
Sachdeva, S., Iliev, R., & Medin, D.L. (2009). Sinning saints and saintly sinners: The  
 paradox of moral self-regulation. Psychological Science, 20, 523-528. 
 
Schelling, T. (1968). The life you save may be your own. In S.B. Chase, Jr. (Ed.),  
Problems in public expenditure analysis (pp. 127-162). Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution.  
 
Seo, M-G., & Barrett, L. F. (2007). Being emotional during decision-making: Good or  
 bad? An empirical investigation. Academy of Management Journal, 50, 923-940.  
 63   
 
 
Shaw, L.L., Batson, C.D., & Todd, R.M. (1994). Empathy avoidance: Forestalling feeling 
for  another in order to escape the motivational consequences. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 879-887. 
 
Sherman, S.J., Beike, D.R., & Ryalls, K.R. (1999). Dual-processing accounts of 
inconsistencies in responses to general versus specific cases. In. E. Chaiken & Y. 
Trope (Eds.), Dual-process theories in social psychology (pp. 203-230). New 
York: Guilford. 
 
Simons, J.S., & Gaher, R.M. (2005). The Distress Tolerance Scale: Development and  
 validation of a self-report measure. Motivation and Emotion, 29, 83-102. 
 
Slovic, P. (2007). “If I look at the mass I will never act”: Psychic numbing and genocide.  
 Judgment and Decision Making, 2, 79-95. 
 
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D.G. (2002). The affect heuristic. In  
 T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The  
 psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 397-420). New York: Cambridge University  
 Press.  
 
Small, D. A., Loewenstein, G., & Slovic, P. (2007). Sympathy and callousness: The  
 impact of deliberative thought on donations to identifiable and statistical victims.  
 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 102, 143-153.  
 
Small, D., & Simonsohn, U. (2006). Friends of victims: The impact of personal  
 relationships with victims on generosity toward others. Journal of Consumer  
 Research, 35, 532-542. 
 
Tensbrunsel, A.E., Diekmann, K.A., Wade-Benzoni, K.A., & Bazerman, M. (2007). The  
 ethical mirage: A temporal explanation as to why we aren’t as ethical as we think  
 we are. Harvard Business School Working Paper #08-012. Accessed online from  
 http://www.people.hbs.edu/mbazerman/Papers/08-012.pdf. 
 
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal construal. Psychological Review, 110, 403-
421.  
 
Valdesolo, P., & DeSteno, D. (2008). The duality of virtue: Deconstructing the moral  
 hypocrite. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 1334-1338. 
 
Västfjäll, D., Peters, E., & Slovic, P. (forthcoming). Representation, affect, and  
 willingness-to-donate to children in need. Unpublished manuscript. 
 
Williams, L. E., & Bargh, J. A. (2008). Keeping one's distance: The influence of spatial  
 distance cues on affect and evaluation. Psychological Science, 19, 302-308. 
 
 64   
 
Wilson, T. D., & Gilbert, D. T. (2003). Affective forecasting. In M. Zanna (Ed.),  
 Advances in experimental social psychology, Vol. 35 (pp. 345-411). New York:  
 Elsevier.  
 
Wranik, T., Barrett, L. F., & Salovey, P. (2007). Intelligent emotion regulation. In J.J.  
 Gross (Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation (pp. 393-428). New York: Guilford. 
 
 65   
 
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations for Other Variables, Study 1 
  
  
                                    








Distance 4.68 (SD=.82) 4.59 (SD=.85) 4.60 (SD=.70) 4.68 (SD=.72) 
Diff. of Resp. 0.67 (SD=1.81) 0.17 (SD=1.23) 0.17 (SD=1.37) 0.13 (SD=1.18) 
Efficacy 4.78 (SD=1.23) 4.69 (SD=1.54) 4.63 (SD=1.57) 4.29 (SD=1.36) 
Habituation 5.68 (SD=.72) 5.40 (SD=.86) 5.58 (SD=1.08) 5.66 (SD=.95) 
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations for Regulation Skill Variables, Study 2 
   
                                     
One Victim Four Victims Eight Victims 
Difficulties in Emotion 
Regulation 2.26 (SD=.66) 2.13 (SD=.48) 2.06 (SD=.50) 
Distress Tolerance 3.50 (SD=.56) 3.70 (SD=.57) 3.42 (SD=.64) 
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Figure 2. Images of crisis victims.   
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Note. Means are reported on the graph. Standard deviations: .89 (No Help Request, One 
Victim), .53 (No Help Request, Eight Victims), .78 (Help Request, One Victim), .76 (Help 
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Note. Means are reported on the graph. Standard deviations: .54 (No Help Request, One 
Victim), .51 (No Help Request, Eight Victims), .47 (Help Request, One Victim), .57 (Help 
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Note. Means are reported on the graph. Standard deviations: 1.13 (No Help Request, One 
Victim), .77 (No Help Request, Eight Victims), .85 (Help Request, One Victim), .95 (Help 
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Figure 8. Online emotion rating by number of victims and Difficulties in Emotion Regulation 




Note. “Poor Regulators” are those that fall above the median value of 2.11 on the DERS; 
“Skilled Regulators” are those that fall below this median value. 
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Note. “Low Distress Tolerance” represents those that fall below the median value of 3.60 on 
the DTS; “High Distress Tolerance” represents those that fall above this median value. 
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Note. Means are reported on the graph. Standard deviations: .47 (One Victim), .32 (Four 
Victims), .46 (Eight Victims). 
 
